Abstract. In tandem with recent progress on computing on encrypted data via fully homomorphic encryption, we present a framework for computing on authenticated data * Supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) via the notion of slightly homomorphic signatures, or P-homomorphic signatures. With such signatures, it is possible for a third party to derive a signature on the object m from a signature of m as long as P(m, m ) = 1 for some predicate P which captures the "authenticatable relationship" between m and m. Moreover, a derived signature on m reveals no extra information about the parent m. Our definition is carefully formulated to provide one unified framework for a variety of distinct concepts in this area, including arithmetic, homomorphic, quotable, redactable, transitive signatures, and more. It includes being unable to distinguish a derived signature from a fresh one even when given the original signature. The inability to link derived signatures to their original sources prevents some practical privacy and linking attacks, which is a challenge not satisfied by most prior works. Under this strong definition, we then provide generic constructions for all univariate and closed predicates, and specific efficient constructions for a broad class of natural predicates such as quoting, subsets, weighted sums, averages, and Fourier transforms. To our knowledge, these are the first efficient constructions for these predicates (excluding subsets) that provably satisfy this strong security notion.
Introduction
In tandem with recent progress on computing any function on encrypted data, e.g., [33, 56, 59] , this work explores computing on unencrypted signed data. In the recent years, several independent lines of research touched on this area:
• Quoting/redacting: [1, [20] [21] [22] 36, 39, 46, 58] Given Alice's signature on some message m anyone should be able to derive Alice's signature on a subset of m. Quoting typically applies to signed text messages where one wants to derive Alice's signature on a substring of m. Quoting can also apply to signed images where one wants to derive a signature on a subregion of the image (say, a face or an object) and to data structures where one wants to derive a signature of a subset of the data structure such as a sub-tree of a tree.
• Arithmetic: [15] [16] [17] 26, 32, 40, 63, 65 ] Given Alice's signature on vectors v 1 , . . . , v k ∈ F n p anyone should be able to derive Alice's signature on a vector v in the linear span of v 1 , . . . , v k . Arithmetic on signed data is motivated by applications to secure network coding [31] . We show that these schemes can be used to compute authenticated linear operations such as computing an authenticated weighted sum of signed data and an authenticated Fourier transform. As a practical consequence of this, we show that an untrusted database storing signed data (e.g., employee salaries) can publish an authenticated average of the data without leaking any other information about the stored data. Recent constructions go beyond linear operations and support low degree polynomial computations [15] .
• Transitivity: [8, 9, 37, 45, 50, 51, 54, 64 ] Given Alice's signature on edges in a graph G anyone should be able to derive Alice's signature on a pair of vertices (u, v) if and only if there is a path in G from u to v. The derived signature on the pair (u, v) must be indistinguishable from a fresh signature on (u, v) had Alice generated one herself [45] . This requirement ensures that the derived signature on (u, v) reveals no information about the path from u to v used to derive the signature.
In this paper, we put forth a general framework for computing on authenticated data that encompasses these lines of research and much more. While prior definitions mostly contained artifacts specific to the type of malleability they supported, and thus, were hard to compare to one another, we generalize and strengthen these disparate notions into a single definition. This definition can be instantiated with any predicate, and we allow repeated computation on the signatures (e.g., it is possible to quote from a quoted signature). During our study, we realized that the "privacy" notions offered by many existing definitions are, in our view, insufficient for some practical applications. We therefore require a stronger (and seemingly a significantly more challenging to achieve) property called context hiding. Under this definition, we provide two generic solutions for computing signatures on any univariate, closed predicate; however, these generic constructions are not efficient. We also present efficient constructions for three problems: quoting substrings in Sect. 4 , a subset predicate in Sect. 5, and a weighted average over data in Sect. 6 (which captures weighted sums and Fourier transforms). Our quoting substring construction is novel and significantly more efficient than the generic solutions. For the problems of subsets and weighted averages, we show somewhat surprising connections to respective existing solutions in attribute-based encryption and network coding signatures.
After the appearance of the conference version of this work, this concept was explored further. Attrapadung, Libert, and Peters [3] studied an even stronger notion of privacy, which they called complete context-hiding, and later [4] provided efficient quotable and linearly homomorphic signatures satisfying this strong notion. Chase, Kohlweiss, Lysyanskaya, and Meiklejohn [27] extended the context-hiding definition of Attrapadung et al. to allow for adversarially generated keys and signatures and studied applications to anonymous credentials. Recently, Deiseroth, Fehr, Fischlin, Maasz, Reimers, and Stein [29] explored computing on authenticated data when the predicates may be adjusted or combined.
Overview
A general framework Let M be some message space and let 2 M be its powerset. Consider a predicate P : 2 M × M → {0, 1} mapping a set of messages and a message to a bit. Loosely speaking we say that a signature scheme supports computations with respect to P if the following holds:
Let M ⊂ M be a set of messages and let m be a derived message, namely m satisfies P(M, m ) = 1. Then there exists an efficient procedure that can derive Alice's signature on m from Alice's independent signatures on all of the messages in M.
For the quoting application, the predicate P is defined as P(M, m ) = 1 iff m is a quote from the set of messages M. Here, we focus on quoting from a single message m so that P is false whenever M contains more than one component 1 , and thus use the notation P(m, m ) as shorthand for P({m}, m ). The predicate P for arithmetic computations is defined in Appendix 2.3 and essentially says that P (v 1 , . . . , v k ), v) is true whenever v is in the span of v 1 , . . . , v k .
We emphasize that signature derivation can be iterative. For example, given a messagesignature pair (m, σ ) from Alice, Bob can publish a derived message-signature pair (m , σ ) for an m where P(m, m ) holds. Charlie, using (m , σ ), may further derive a signature σ on m . In the quoting application, Charlie is quoting from a quote which is perfectly fine. Security We give a clean security definition that captures two properties: unforgeability and context hiding. We briefly discuss each in turn and give precise definitions in the next section.
• Unforgeability captures the idea that an attacker may be given various derived signatures (perhaps iteratively derived) on messages of his choice. The attacker should be unable to produce a signature on a message that is not derivable from the set of signed messages in his possession. For example, suppose Alice generates (m, σ ) and gives it to Bob who then publishes a derived signature (m , σ ). Then an attacker given (m , σ ) should be unable to produce a signature on m or on any other message m such that P(m , m ) = 0.
• Context hiding captures an important privacy property: a signature should reveal nothing more than the message being signed. In particular, if a signature on m was derived from a signature on m, an attacker should not learn anything about m other than what can be inferred from m . This should be true even if the original signature on m is revealed. For example, a signed quote should not reveal anything about the message from which it was quoted, including its length, the position of the quote, whether its parent document is the same as another quote, whether it was derived from a given signed message or generated freshly, etc.
Defining context hiding is an interesting and subtle task. In the next section, we give a definition that captures a very strong privacy requirement. We discuss earlier attempts at defining privacy following our definition in Sect. 2.4; while many prior works use a similar sounding intuition as we give above, most contain a fundamental difference to ours in their formalization. We note that notions such as group or ring signatures [7, 13, 23, 28, 53] have considered the problem of hiding the identity of a signer among a set of users. Context hiding ensures privacy for the data rather than the signer. Our goal is to hide the legacy of how a signature was created.
Efficiency We require that the size of a signature, whether fresh or derived, depend only on the size of the object being signed. This rules out solutions where the signature grows with each derivation.
Generic Approaches
We begin with two generic constructions that can be inefficient. They apply to closed, univariate predicates, namely predicates P(M, m ) where M contains a single message (P is false when |M| > 1) and where if P(a, b) = P(b, c) = 1 then P(a, c) = 1. The first construction uses any standard signature scheme S where the signing algorithm is deterministic. (One can enforce determinism using PRFs [34] ). To sign a message m ∈ M, one uses S to sign each message m such that P(m, m ) = 1. The signature consists of all these signature components. To verify a signature for m, one checks the signature component corresponding to the message m. To derive a signature m from m, one copies the signature components for all m such that P(m , m ) = 1. Soundness of the construction follows from the security of the underlying standard scheme S and context hiding from the fact that signing in S is deterministic.
Unfortunately, these signatures may become large consisting up to |M| signature components-impacting both the signing time and signature size. Our second generic construction alleviates the space burden by using an RSA accumulator. The construction works in a similar brute force fashion where a signature on m is an accumulator value on all m such that P(m, m ) = 1. While this produces short signatures, the time component of both verification and derivation are even worse than the first generic approach. Thus, these generic approaches are too expensive for most interesting predicates. We detail these generic approaches and proofs in Sect. 3, where we also discuss a generic construction using NIZK.
Our Quoting Construction. We turn to more efficient constructions. First, we set out to construct a signature for quoting substrings 2 , which although conceptually simple is nontrivial to realize securely. As an efficiency baseline, we note that the brute force generic construction of the quoting predicate would result in n 2 components for a signature on n characters. So any interesting construction must perform more efficiently than this. We prove our construction selectively secure. 3 In addition, we give some potential future directions for achieving adaptive security and removing the use of random oracles.
Our construction uses bilinear groups to link different signature components together securely, but in such a way that the context can be hidden by a re-randomizing step in the derivation algorithm. A signature in our system on a message of length n consists of n lg n group elements; intuitively organized as lg n group elements assigned to each character. To derive a new signature on a substring of characters, one roughly removes the group elements not associated with the new substring and then re-randomizes the remaining part of the signature. This results in a new signature of lg group elements. The technical challenge consists in simultaneously allowing re-randomization and preserving the "linking" between successive characters. In addition, there is a second option in our derive algorithm that allows for the derivation of a short signature of lg group elements; however, the derive procedure cannot be applied again to this short signature. Thus, we support quoting from quotes, and also provide a compression option which produces a very short quote, but the price for this is that it cannot be quoted from further.
Computing Signatures on Subsets and Weighted Averages Our final two contributions are schemes for deriving signatures on subsets and weighted averages on signatures. Rather than create entirely new systems, we show connections to existing Attribute-Based Encryption schemes and Network Coding Signatures. Briefly, our subset construction extends the concept of Naor [14] who observed that every IBE scheme can be transformed into a standard signature scheme by applying the IBE KeyGen algorithm as a signing 2 A substring of x 1 . . . x n is some x i . . . x j where i, j ∈ [1, n] and i ≤ j. We emphasize that we are not considering subsequences. Thus, it is not possible, in this setting, to extract a signature on "I like fish" from one on "I do not like fish". 3 Following an analog of [24] , selective security for signatures requires the attacker to give the forgery message before seeing the verification key.
algorithm. Here we show an analog for known Ciphertext-Policy (CP) ABE schemes. The KeyGen algorithm which generates a key for a set S of attributes can be used as a signing algorithm for the set S. For known CP-ABE systems [10, 41, 62] it is straightforward to derive a key for a subset S of S and to re-randomize the signature/key. To verify a signature on S we can apply Naor's signature-from-IBE idea and encrypt a random message X to a policy that is an AND of all the attributes in S and see if the signature can be used as an ABE key to decrypt to X . Signatures for subsets have been previously considered in [37, §6.4] , but without context hiding requirements. We provide further details in Sect. 5. Our construction for weighted sums is presented in Sect. 6, where we discuss how this applies to Fourier transforms.
Definitions
Definition 2.1 (Derived messages) Let M be a message space and let P : 2 M ×M → {0, 1} be a predicate from sets over M and a message in M to a bit. We say that a message m is derivable from the set M ⊆ M if P(M, m ) = 1. We denote by P * (M) the set of messages derivable from M by repeated derivation. That is, let P 0 (M) be the set of messages derivable from M and for i > 0 let P i (M) be the set of messages derivable
We define the closure of P, denoted P * , as the predicate defined by
A P-homomorphic signature scheme for message space M and predicate P is a triple of PPT algorithms: KeyGen(1 λ ): the key generation algorithm outputs a key pair (pk, sk). We treat the secret key sk as a signature on the empty tuple ε ∈ M * . We also assume that pk is embedded in sk. SignDerive(pk, ({σ m } m∈M , M), m , w): the algorithm takes as input the public key, a set of messages M ⊆ M and corresponding signatures {σ m } m∈M , a derived message m ∈ M, and possibly some auxiliary information w. It produces a new signature σ or a special symbol ⊥ to represent failure. For complicated predicates P, the auxiliary information w serves as a witness that P(M, m ) = 1. To simplify the notation we often drop w as an explicit argument.
As shorthand we write Sign(sk, m) := SignDerive(pk, (sk, ε), m, ·) to denote that any message can be derived when the original signature is the signing key. For a set of messages M = {m 1 , . . . , m k } ⊂ M * it is convenient to let Sign(sk, M) denote independently signing each of the k messages, namely:
Verify(pk, m, σ ): given a public key, message, and purported signature σ , the algorithm returns 1 if the signature is valid and 0 otherwise. We assume that testing m ∈ M can be done efficiently, and that Verify returns 0 if m ∈ M.
Correctness We require that for all key pairs (sk, pk) generated by KeyGen(1 n ) and for all M ∈ M * and m ∈ M we have: 
Security: Unforgeability
To define unforgeability, we extend the basic notion of existential unforgeability with respect to adaptive chosen-message attacks [35] . The definition captures the idea that if the attacker is given a set of signed messages (either primary or derived) then the only messages he can sign are derivations of the signed messages he was given. This is defined using a game between a challenger and an adversary A with respect to scheme over message space M.
The challenger runs KeyGen(1 λ ) to obtain (pk, sk) and sends pk to A. The challenger maintains two sets T and Q that are initially empty. Queries: Proceeding adaptively, the adversary issues the following queries to the challenger:
• Sign(m ∈ M): the challenger generates a unique handle h, runs Sign(sk, m) → σ and places (h, m, σ ) into a table T . It returns the handle h to the adversary. to the set Q.
Output: Eventually, the adversary outputs a pair (σ , m ). The output of the game is 1 (i.e., the adversary wins the game) if:
• Verify(pk, m , σ ) = 1 and, • let M ⊆ M be the set of messages in Q then P * (M, m ) = 0 where P * is the closure of P from Definition 2.1.
Else, the output of the game is 0. Define Forg A as the probability that Pr[Unforg( ,
Interestingly, for some predicates it may be difficult to test if the adversary won the game. For all the predicates we consider in this paper, this will be quite easy.
Definition 2.3. ((Unforgeability) A P-homomorphic signature scheme is unforgeable with respect to adaptive chosen-message attacks if for all PPT adversaries A, the function Forg A is negligible in λ.
A P-homomorphic signature scheme is selective unforgeable with respect to adaptive chosen-message attacks if for all PPT adversaries A who begin the above game by announcing the message m on which they will forge, Forg A is negligible in λ.
Properties of the definition By taking P to be the equality oracle, namely P(x, y) = 1 iff x = y, we obtain the standard unforgeability requirement for signatures.
Notice that Sign and SignDerive queries return handles, but do not return the actual signatures. A system proven secure under this definition adequately rules out the following attack: suppose (m, σ ) is a message signature pair and (m , σ ) is a message-signature pair derived from it, namely σ = SignDerive(pk, σ , m, m ). For example, suppose m is a quote from m. Then given (m , σ ) it should be difficult to produce a signature on m and indeed our definition treats a signature on m as a valid forgery.
The unforgeability game imposes some constraints on P: (1) P must be reflexive, i.e., P(m, m) = 1 for all m ∈ M, (2) P must be monotone, i.e., P(M, m ) ⇒ P(M , m ) where M ⊆ M . It is easy to see that predicates that do not satisfy these requirements cannot be realized under Definition 2.3. We put forth the following powerful statistical definition of context hiding and discuss its implications following the definition. We were most easily able to leverage a statistical definition for our proofs, although we also give an alternative computational definition in Sect. 2.3. 
The distributions are taken over the coins of Sign and SignDerive. Without loss of generality, we assume that pk can be computed from sk.
The definition states that a derived signature on m , from an honestly-generated original signature, is statistically indistinguishable from a fresh signature on m . This implies that a derived signature on m is indistinguishable from a signature generated independently of M. Therefore, the derived signature cannot (provably) reveal any information about M beyond what is revealed by m . By a simple hybrid argument the same holds even if the adversary is given multiple derived signatures from M.
Moreover, Definition 2.4 requires that a derived signature look like a fresh signature even if the original signature on M is known. Hence, if for example someone quotes from a signed recommendation letter and somehow the original signed recommendation letter becomes public, it would be impossible to link the signed quote to the original signed letter. The same holds even if the signing key sk is leaked.
Thus, Definition 2.4 captures a broad range of privacy requirements for derived signatures. Earlier work in this area [19, 20, 22, 39] only considered weaker privacy requirements using more complex definitions. The simplicity and breadth of Definition 2.4 is one of our key contributions. Definition 2.4 uses statistical indistinguishability meaning that even an unbounded adversary cannot distinguish derived signatures from newly created ones. In Sect. 2.3, we give a definition using computational indistinguishability which is considerably more complex since the adversary needs to be given signing oracles. In the unbounded case of Definition 2.4 the adversary can simply recover a secret key sk from the public key and answer its own signature queries which greatly simplifies the definition of context hiding. All the signature schemes in this paper satisfy the statistical Definition 2.4.
As mentioned above, the context-hiding guarantee applies to all derivations that begin with an honestly-generated signature. One might imagine a scenario where a malicious signer creates a signature that passes the verification algorithm, but contains a "watermark" that allows the signer to detect if other signatures are derived from it. To prevent such attacks from malicious signers, we could alter the definition so that indistinguishability holds for any derivative that results from a signature that passed the verification algorithm.
A Computational Definition of Context Hiding
For systems that are strongly context hiding, unforgeability follows from a simpler game than that of Sect. 2.1. In particular, it suffices to just give the adversary the ability to obtain top level signatures signed by sk. In this section, we define this simpler unforgeability game and prove equivalence to Definition 2.3 using strong context hiding. Let (KeyGen, SignDerive, Verify) be a P-homomorphic signature scheme for predicate P and message M. Consider the following game to model context hiding:
Setup:
The challenger runs the algorithm (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1 λ ) to obtain the public key pk and the secret key sk, and gives pk to the adversary.
Query Phase 1:
Proceeding adaptively, the adversary may query any of the three oracles from the unforgeability game: SignDerive(pk, σ, m, m ) . The challenger then picks a random b ∈ {0, 1} and returns (σ, σ b ) to the adversary. Note: there are no restrictions on m, m other than that they be in the message space; in particular, they could be equal and one or both could have been previously signed. Query Phase 2: Proceeding adaptively, the adversary may query the oracles from Phase 1. Output: Eventually, the adversary will output a bit b and is said to win if b = b .
We define Adv CH
A to be the probability that adversary A wins in the above game minus Proof. Let = (KeyGen, SignDerive, Verify) be a homomorphic signature scheme and let A be an adversary that has advantage Adv C H A ( ) = p(λ) in the context-hiding game. The advantage probability for A is taken over the random coins of the key generation, random coins of the Sign and SignDerive operations used in the first query phase, the random coins used by algorithm A, and the random coins used by the rest of the experiment. Therefore by an averaging argument, there must exist some particular key pair (P K, SK ) ← KeyGen(1 λ ; z 1 ), some particular random tape z q for the Sign and SignDerive operations used in the first query phase, some particular random coins z A for A, and some particular message pair (m, m ) output by A over which the probability of A winning the context-hiding game in this case is at least p(λ). Let the values of the random tapes be given as non-uniform advice.
We show how this information can be used to construct a (non-uniform) adversary A that distinguishes {(SK, σ, Sign(SK, m )} from {(SK, σ, SignDerive(P K, σ, m, m )} with probability p(λ) for the triple ((P K, SK ), m, m ). Thus, if is strongly context hiding, then p(λ) must be exponentially small, and so must also be contexthiding.
The adversary A works as follows: On input the challenge tuple (SK, σ, σ ), A begins to run the context-hiding experiment for A(P K ; z A ). A answers the queries that A asks by using SK and the random tape z q to run Sign and SignDerive. When A outputs a challenge message pair (m, m ) (which must occur by construction), then A answers with (σ, σ ). A answers the second-phase queries of A using SK and fresh random coins. Finally, when A outputs b , A echoes this answer as output and halts.
First observe that A performs a perfect simulation of the context-hiding game. When the input pair (σ, σ ) corresponds to (Sign(SK, m), Sign(SK, m )), then A simulates the context-hiding game for b = 0. In the other case, A simulates the context-hiding game for b = 1. Therefore, A distinguishes
with probability p(λ).
Simplified Unforgeability Under Strong Context Hiding
We now show how the strong context hiding property can help simplify the security argument for unforgeability. In particular, we introduce a weaker notion of unforgeability in which the adversary only makes calls to the Sign oracle and immediately receives a signature.
-Game NHU( , A, λ, P): This game is the same as the Unforg( , A, λ, P) game with the exception that only the following query is allowed:
-Sign(m ∈ M): the oracle computes σ ← Sign(SK, m), adds m to Q and returns σ .
Note, the only difference between game NHU and the standard unforgeability game for a signature scheme is that in this game, the adversary only wins if it produces a forgery on a signature m * such that for all m ∈ Q, P(m, m * ) = 0, whereas in the standard unforgeability game, the adversary wins if it produces a signature on any message that is not in Q.
Definition 2.7.
A quoteable signature scheme is NHU-unforgeable if for all efficient adversaries A, it holds that Pr[NHU( , A, λ, P) = 1] < negl(λ) for some negligible function λ.
Lemma 2.8. A signature scheme that is NHU-unforgeable and strongly context hiding is Unforg-unforgeable.
Proof. Our plan is to present a series of hybrid experiments that are meant to simplify the quotable unforgeability game. Hybrid H 1 ( , A, λ, P) Consider the first hybrid experiment H 1 which is the same as the unforgeability game Unforg( , A, λ, P), with the exception that all Sign and SignDerive queries are lazily evaluated. That is, when A makes a query, the experiment responds in the following way:
. Replace the entry with (i, σ, m, i 1 ), and return σ .
This claim follows by inspection. For any query that is eventually revealed, the same operations are performed in both H 1 and the original game. For any query that is never revealed, no operation in H 1 is performed; but this does not affect the view of the adversary, and therefore does not affect the output of the adversary. Hybrid H 2,i ( , A, λ, P) The second hybrid is the same as H 1 except that the first i queries to Reveal are answered using Reveal 2 described below, and the remaining queries are answered as per H 1 : (The only difference is that Sign(SK, m 1 ) is used in place of
Replace the entry with (i, σ, m, i 1 ), and return σ .
Claim 2.10. H 2,0 ( , A, λ, P) is identically distributed to H 1 ( , A, λ, P).
By inspection.
This claim follows via the strong context-hiding property of the signature scheme because this property guarantees Sign(SK, m ) and SignDerive(P K, σ, m, m ) are statistically close.
Suppose that A makes = poly(λ) queries. Observe that H 2, ( , A, λ, P) only evaluates Sign, and only does so on messages that are immediately returned to the adversary. Thus, H 2, is syntactically equivalent to the NHU game. Since the H 2, game enables A to produce a forgery with the same probability as Unforg( , A, λ, P), we have that Unforg( , A, λ, P) = NHU( , A, λ, P) which completes the lemma.
Related Work
Early work on quotable signatures [19, 21, 25, 36, 39, 47, 48, 58] supports quoting from a single document, but does not achieve the privacy or unforgeability properties we are aiming for. For example, if simple quoting of messages is all that is desired, then the following folklore solution would suffice: simply sign the Merkle hash of a document. A quote represents some sub-tree of the Merkle hash; so a quoter could include enough intermediate hash nodes along with the original signature in any quote. A verifier could simply hash the quote, and then build the Merkle hash tree using the computed hash and the intermediate hashes, and compare with the original signature. Notice, however, that every quote in this scheme reveals information about the original source document. In particular, each quote reveals information about where in the document it appears. Thus, this simple quoting scheme is not context hiding in our sense.
The work whose definition is closest to what we envision is the recent work on redacted signatures of Chang et al. [25] and Brzuska et al. [19] (see also Naccache [49, p. 63] and Boneh-Freeman [15, 16] ). 4 However, there is a subtle, but fundamental difference between their definition and the privacy notion we are aiming for. In our formulation, a quoted signature should be indistinguishable from a fresh signature, even when the distinguisher is given the original signature. (We capture this by an even stronger game where a derived signature is distributed statistically close to a fresh signature). In contrast, the definitions of [15, 16, 19, 25] do not provide the distinguisher with the original signature. Thus, it may be possible to link a quoted document to its original source (and indeed it is in the constructions of [15, 16, 19, 25] ), which can have negative privacy implications. Overcoming such document linkage while maintaining unforgeability is a real technical challenge. This requires moving beyond techniques that use nonces to link parts of messages.
Indeed, in most prior constructions, such as [19, 25] , nonces are used to prevent "mixand-match" attacks (e.g., forming a "quote" using pieces of two different messages). Unfortunately, these nonces reveal the history of derivation, since they cannot change during each derivation operation. Arguably, much of the technical difficulty in our current work comes precisely from the effort to meet our definition and hide the lineage. We introduce new techniques in this work which link pieces together using randomness that can be re-randomized in controlled ways.
Another line of work studies computing on authenticated data by holders of secret information. Examples include sanitizable signatures [1, 20, 22, 46, 48] that allow a proxy to compute signatures on related messages, but requires the proxy to have a secret key, and incremental signatures [6] , where the signer can efficiently make small edits to his signed data. In contrast, our proposal is more along the lines of homomorphic encryption and Rivest's vision [51] , where anyone can compute on the authenticated data. 4 As acknowledged in Sect. 2.2 of Boneh-Freeman [15] , our definitional notion is stronger than and predates the "weak context hiding" notion of [15] . Indeed, the fact that [15] uses our framework lends support to its generality, and the fact that they could not achieve our context-hiding notion highlights its difficulty. Their "weak" definition, which is equivalent to [19] , only ensures privacy when the original signatures remain hidden. In their system, signature derivation is deterministic and therefore once the original signatures become public it is easy to tell where the derived signature came from. Our signatures achieve full context hiding so that derived signatures remain private no matter what information is revealed. This is considerably harder and is not known how to do for the lattice-based signatures in Boneh-Freeman.
Generic Constructions for Simple Predicates
Let M be a finite message space. We say that a predicate P : M * × M → {0, 1} is a simple predicate if the following properties hold:
1. P is false whenever its left input is a tuple of length greater than 1, 2. P is a closed predicate (i.e., P is equal to its closure P * ; see Sect. 2.1). 3. For all m ∈ M, P(m, m) = 1.
In this section, we present and discuss generic approaches for computing on authenticated data with respect to any simple predicate P. Note that the quoting of substrings or subsequences (i.e., redacting) are examples of simple predicates.
We begin with two inefficient constructions. The first takes a brute force approach that constructs long signatures that are easy to verify. The second takes an accumulator approach that constructs shorter signatures at the cost of less efficient verification. We conclude by discussing the limitations of a generic NIZK proof of knowledge approach.
A Brute Force Construction From Any Signature Scheme
Let (G, S, V ) be a signature scheme with a deterministic signing algorithm. 5 One can construct a P-homomorphic signature scheme for any simple predicate P as follows:
The setup algorithm runs G(1 λ ) → (pk, sk) and outputs this key pair. Sign(sk, m ∈ M): While Sign is simply a special case of the SignDerive algorithm, we will explicitly provide both algorithms here for clarity purposes. 
Efficiency Discussion The efficiency of the above approach depends on the message space and the predicate P. For instance, the brute force approach for signing a message of n characters, where P(m, m ) outputs 1 if and only if m is a substring of m, will result in O(n 2 ) sub-signatures (one for each of the O(n 2 ) substrings). If one wanted to "quote" subgraphs from a graph, this approach is intractable, as a graph of n nodes will generate an exponential in n number of subgraphs. Proof of the above theorem is rather straightforward. The context-hiding property follows from the uniqueness of the signatures generated by the honest signing algorithms.
The unforgeability property follows from the fact that an adversary cannot obtain a signature on any message not derivable from those she queried or one could use this signature to directly break the regular unforgeability of the underlying signature scheme. The correctness property is actually the most complex to verify: it requires the two restrictions on the predicate P made above.
An Accumulator-based Construction
Assumption 3.2. (RSA [52] ) Let k be the security parameter. Let a positive integer N be the product of two random k-bit primes p, q. Let e be a randomly chosen positive integer less than and relatively prime to φ(N ) = ( p − 1)(q − 1). Then no PPT algorithm given (N , e) and a random y ∈ Z * N as input can compute x such that x e ≡ y mod N with non-negligible probability. 
Consider the following RSA accumulator solution which supports short signatures, but the computation required to derive a new signature is expensive. Let P be any univariate predicate with the above restrictions.
We now describe the algorithms. While Sign is simply a special case of the SignDerive algorithm, we will explicitly provide both algorithms here for clarity purposes.
KeyGen(1 λ ):
The setup algorithm chooses N as a 20λ-bit RSA modulus and a random value a ∈ Z N . It also chooses a hash function H p that maps arbitrary strings to 2λ-bit prime numbers, e.g., [38] , which we treat as a random oracle. 6 Output the public key pk = (H p , N , a) and keep as the secret key sk, the factorization of N . Sign(sk, m ∈ M): Let U = P 0 ({m}) = {m | m ∈ M and P(m, m ) = 1}. Compute and output the signature as
SignDerive(pk, σ, m, m ):
The derivation is computed as follows. First check that P(m, m ) = 1. If not, then output ⊥. Otherwise, let U = P 0 ({m }). Compute and output the signature as
Thus, the signature is of the form a
Verify(pk, m, σ ): Accept if and only if
Efficiency Discussion In the above scheme, signatures require only one element in Z * N . However, the cost of signing depends on P and the size of the message space. For example, computing an -symbol quote from an n-symbol message requires O(n(n − )) evaluations of H p and O(n(n − )) modular exponentiations. The prime search component of H p will likely be the dominating factor. Verification requires O( 2 ) evaluations of H p and O( 2 ) modular exponentiations, for an -symbol quote. Thus, this scheme optimizes on space, but may require significant computation. Proof. This property is derived from the fact that a signature on any given message is deterministic. Let the public key P K be (H p , N , a) and challenge be any m, m where
Because Sign(sk, m ) and SignDerive(pk, (σ, m), m ) are identical, for any adversary A, the probability that A distinguishes the two is exactly 1/2, and so the advantage in the strong context hiding game is 0. Proof. Our reduction only works on certain types of RSA challenges, as in [38] . In particular, this reduction only attempts to solve RSA challenges (N , e * , y) where e * is an odd prime. Fortunately, good challenges will occur with non-negligible probability. We know that e * is less than and relatively prime to φ(N ) < N , which implies it cannot be 2. We also know, by Theorem 3.4 , that the number of primes that are less than N is at least N lg N . Thus, a loose bound on the probability of e * being a prime is
Now, we describe the reduction. Our proof first applies Lemma 2.8, which allows us to only consider adversaries A that ask queries to Sign oracle in the NHU game. Moreover, suppose adversary A queries the random oracle H p on at most s unique inputs. Without loss of generality, we will assume that all queries to this deterministic oracle are unique and that whenever Sign is called on message M, then H p is automatically called with all unique substrings of M. Suppose an adversary A can produce a forgery with probability in the NHU game; then we can construct an adversary B that breaks the RSA assumption (with odd prime e * ) with probability /s minus a negligible amount as follows.
On e i ∈E−primes(U ) e i ) = 1 (recall, they are all distinct primes), then B can apply the efficient algorithm from Lemma 3.3 to obtain a value z ∈ Z N such that z e * = y mod N . B outputs z as the solution to the RSA challenge.
Analysis We now argue that any successful adversary A against our scheme will have success in the game presented by B. To do this, we first define a sequence of games, where the first game models the real security game and the final game is exactly the view of the adversary when interacting with B. We then show via a series of claims that if A is successful against Game j, then it will also be successful against Game j + 1. Notice that Game 4 is exactly the view of the adversary when interacting with B. We complete this argument by linking the probability of A's success in these games via a series of claims. The only non-negligible probability gap comes between Games 3 and 4, where there is a factor 1/s loss.
Game 1:
Define Adv A [Game x] as the advantage of adversary A in Game x.
Claim 3.8. If H p is a truly random function, then
Proof. The value e * was chosen independently at random by the RSA challenger, just as H p would have done.
Claim 3.9. If H p is a truly random function, then
Proof. Consider the probability of a repeat occurring when s 2λ-bit primes are chosen at random. By Theorem 3.4, we know that there are at least 2 2λ /(2λ) 2λ-bit primes. Thus, a repeat will occur with probability < s s/(2 2λ /2λ) = 2s 2 λ/2 2λ , which is negligible since s must be polynomial in λ.
Claim 3.10. If H p is a truly random function, then
Proof. If M was never queried to H p , then σ can only be a valid forgery if A guessed the 2λ-bit prime that H p would respond with on input M. By Theorem 3.4, there are at least 2 2λ /2λ such primes and thus the probability of A's correct guess is at most 2λ/2 2λ , which is negligible.
Claim 3.11.
Proof. At this point in our series of games, we conclude that A forges on one of the s queries to H p and that 1 ≤ i * ≤ s was chosen at random. Thus, the probability that A forges on the i * th query is 1/s.
This completes our proof.
On the Limitations of Using a Generic NIZK Proof of Knowledge Approach
Another general approach that one might be tempted to try is to use an NIZK [11] proof of knowledge system to generate a signature on m by proving that one knows a signature on some m such that P(m, m ) holds. Unfortunately, this approach has the standard drawback of generality in that it requires circuit-based (nonblack-box) reductions. In particular, generic NIZK proof systems would require expressing the signature verification method and quoting predicate into, for example, a boolean circuit, a 3-SAT formula, or a Hamiltonian-circuit representation. Even if one were to tailor an NIZK proof of knowledge for these specific statements and therefore avoid costly reductions, another problem emerges with re-quoting. When a quote is re-quoted, then the same process happens for both the original signature scheme circuit, the predicate, and the proof system. Aside from the inefficiency, using standard NIZKPoK systems would leak information about the size of the original message and quotes, and therefore would not satisfy our context-hiding property. 7
A Powers-of-2 Construction for Quoting Substrings
We begin by describing our algebraic setting.
Bilinear Groups and the CDH Assumption
Bilinear Groups and the CDH Assumption Let G and G T be groups of prime order p. A bilinear map is an efficient mapping e : G × G → G T which is both: (bilinear) for all g ∈ G and a, b ← Z p , e(g a , g b ) = e(g, g) ab ; and (non-degenerate) if g generates G, then e(g, g) = 1. We will focus on the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in these groups.
Assumption 4.1. (CDH [30] ) Let g generate a group G of prime order p ∈ (2 λ ). For all PPT adversaries A, the following probability is negligible in λ:
The Quoting Construction
We now provide our main construction for quoting substrings in a text document. It achieves the best time/space efficiency trade-off to our knowledge for this problem. We will have two different types of signatures called Type I and Type II, where a Type I signature can be quoted down to another Type I or Type II signature. A Type II signature cannot be quoted any further, but will be a shorter signature. The quoting algorithm will allow us to quote anything that is a substring of the original message. We point out that the Type I, II signatures of this system conform to the general framework given in Sect. 2. In particular, we can view a message M as a pair (t, m) ∈ {0, 1}, {0, 1} * , where an upper-bound on the length of m is fixed at key generation time. The bit t will identify the message as being Type I or Type II (assume t = 1 signifies Type I signatures), and m will be the quoted substring. The predicate
The bit t will indicate whether the new message is Type I or II (i.e., whether the system can quote further). We note that this description allows an attacker to distinguish between any Type I signature from any Type II signature since the "type bit" of the messages will be different, and thus they will technically be two different messages even if the substring components are equal. For this reason, we will only need to prove context hiding between messages of Type I or Type II, but not across types. In general, flipping the bit t will not result in a valid signature of a different type on the same core message, because the format will be wrong; however, moving from a Type I to a Type II on the same core message is not considered a forgery since Type II signatures can be legally derived from Type I.
For presentational clarity, we will split the description of our quoting algorithm into two quoting algorithms for quoting to Type I and to Type II signatures; likewise we will split the description of our verification algorithm into two separate verification algorithms, one for each type of signature. The type of signature used or created (i.e., bit t) will be implicit in the description.
Notation. We use notation m i, j to denote the substring of m of length j starting at position i.
Intuition:
We begin by giving some intuition. We design Type I signatures that allow re-quoting and Type II signatures that cannot be further quoted, but are ultra-short. For an original message of length n, our signature structure should be able to accommodate starting at any position 1 ≤ i ≤ n and quoting any length 1 ≤ ≤ (n − i + 1) substring. 8 To (roughly) see how this works for a message of length n, visualize (n + 1) columns with ( lg n + 2) rows as in Fig. 1 . The columns correspond to the characters of the message, so if the 14-character message is "abcdefghijklmn" then there are 15 columns, with a character in between each column. The rows correspond to the numbers lg n Fig. 1 . The top diagram represents a signature on abcdefghijklmn with length N = 14. Each arrow corresponds to some group elements in the construction. Logically, whenever the elements corresponding to an arrow are included in a quoted signature, the characters underneath this arrow are included in the quoted message. The bold path through the top diagram shows how to construct a Type II signature on defgh; it is very short, but cannot be re-quoted. The gray box in this figure shows how to construct a Type I signature on cdefghi of length = 7; it includes all the arrows in the lower figure and can be re-quoted. A technical challenge is to enforce that following the arrows is the only way to form a valid signature. down to 0, plus an extra row at the bottom. 9 Each location in the matrix (except along the bottom-most row) contains one or more out-going arrows. We'll establish rules for when these arrows exist and where each arrow ends shortly.
A Type II quote will trace a (lg n+1)-length path on these arrows through this matrix starting in a row (with outgoing arrows) of the column that begins the quote and ending in the lowest row of the first column after the quote ends. The starting row corresponds to the largest power of two less than or equal to the length of the desired quote. For example, to quote "bcdef", start in row 2 immediately to the left of "b" (because 2 2 = 4 is the largest power of two less than 5) and end in row 0 immediately to the right of "f". Intuitively, taking an arrow over a character includes it in the quote. A Type II quote on "defgh" is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
A technical challenge is to make this a O(lg n)-length path rather than a O(n)-length path. To do this, the key insight is to view the length of any possible quote as the sum of powers of two and to allow arrows that correspond to covering the quote in pieces of size corresponding to one operand of the sum at a time. Each location (i c , i r ) in the matrix (except the bottom-most row) contains:
• a "start" arrow: an arrow that goes down one row and over 2 i r columns ending in (i c + 2 i r , i r − 1), if this end point is in the matrix. This adds all characters from position i c to i c + 2 i r − 1 to the quoted substring; effectively adding the largest power-of-two-length prefix of the quote characters. This arrow indicates that the quote starts here. These are represented as S i, j , S i, j pairs in our construction.
• a "one" arrow: an arrow that operates similarly to start arrows and is used to include characters after a start arrow has been used. These are represented as A i, j , A i, j pairs in our construction.
• a "zero" arrow: an arrow that goes straight down one row ending in (i c , i r − 1).
This does not add any characters to the quoted substring. These are represented as D i, j , D i, j pairs in our construction.
A Type II quote always starts with a start arrow and then contains one and zero arrows according to the binary representation of the length of the quote. In our example of original message "abcdefghijklmn", we have 15 columns and 5 rows. We will logically divide our desired substring of "bcdef" (length 5 = 2 2 + 2 0 = 4 + 1) into its powersof-two components "bcde"(length 4 = 2 2 ) and "f" (length 1 = 2 0 ). To form the Type II quote, we start in row 2 (since 4 = 2 2 ) of column 2 (to the left of 'b') and take the start arrow (S 2,2 ) to row 1 of column 7, take the zero arrow (D 7,1 ) to row 0 of column 7, and then take the one arrow (A 7,0 ) to the lowest row of column 8. The arrows "pass over" the characters "bcdef". Figure 1 illustrates this for quote "defgh".
For a quote of length , the elements on this O(lg )-length path of arrows form a very short Type II signature. For Type I signatures, we include all the elements corresponding to all arrows that make connections within the columns corresponding to the quote. We illustrate this in Fig. 1 . This allows quoting of quotes with a signature size of O( lg ).
It is essential for security that the signature structure and data algorithm enforce that the quoting algorithm be used and not allow an attacker to "splice" together a quote from different parts of the signature. We realize this by adding in random "chaining" variables. In order to cancel these out and get a well-formed Type II quote a user must intuitively follow the prescribed procedure (i.e., following the arrows is the only way to form a valid quote). The Construction: We now describe our algorithms. While Sign is simply a special case of the SignDerive algorithm, we will explicitly provide both algorithms here for clarity purposes.
KeyGen(1 λ ):
The algorithm selects a bilinear group G of prime order p > 2 λ with generator g. Let L be the maximum message length supported and denote n = lg(L) . Let H : {0, 1} * → G and H s : {0, 1} * → G be the description of two hash functions that we model as random oracles. Choose random z 0 , . . . , z n−1 , α ∈ Z p . The secret key is (z 0 , . . . , z n−1 , α) and the public key is:
Sign(sk, M = (t, m) ∈ {0, 1} × ≤L ): If t = 1, signatures produced by this algorithm are Type I as described below. If t = 0, the Type II signature can be obtained by running this algorithm and then running the Quote-Type II algorithm below to obtain a quote on the entire message. The message space is treated as ≤ L symbols from alphabet .
Recall: we use notation m i, j to denote the substring of m of length j starting at position i. For i = 3 to + 1 and j = 0 to lg(i − 1) − 1 , choose random values x i, j ∈ Z p . These will serve as our random "chaining" variables, and they should all "cancel" each other out in our short Type II signatures. By definition, set x i,−1 := 0 for all i = 1 to + 1. A signature is comprised of the following values for i = 1 to and j = 0 to lg( −i +1) , for randomly chosen values r i, j ∈ Z p :
[start arrow: start and include power j]
Together with the following values for i = 3 to and j = 0 to min(
[one arrow: include power j and decrease j]
Together with the following values for i = 3 to + 1 and j = 0 to lg(i − 1) − 1 , for randomly chosen values r i, j ∈ Z p :
We provide an example of how to form Type II signatures from this construction shortly. for all i = 1 to + 1. Later, we will choose t i, j values to re-randomize the r i, j terms of σ . The quote signature σ is comprised of the following values: For i = 1 to and j = 0 to lg( − i + 1) , for randomly chosen t i, j ∈ Z p :
Together with the following values for i = 3 to and j = 0 to min( lg(i − 1) − 1 , lg( − i + 1) ), for randomly chosen t i, j ∈ Z p :
Together with the following values for i = 3 to + 1 and j = 0 to lg(i − 1) − 1 , for randomly chosen t i, j ∈ Z p : • If the jth bit of is 1, set B :
To • for i = 3 to and j = 0 to min ( lg(i − 1) − 1 , lg( − i + 1) ),
• and for i = 3 to + 1 and j = 0 to lg
Verify-Type II(pk, m, σ ): We give the verification algorithm for Type II signatures. Parse σ as (B, S, Z β−1 , . . . , Z 0 ) . Let = |m| and β be the index of the highest bit of that is set to 1. If σ does not include exactly β Z i values, reject. Set C := 1 and k = 1. From j = β − 1 down to 0, proceed as follows:
• If the jth bit of is 1, set C := C · e(H (m k,2 j ), Z j ) and k := k + 2 j ;
• If the jth bit of is 0, set C := C · e(g z j , Z j ). e(B, g) = e(g, g) α · e(H s (m 1,2 β ) , S) · C. 
Accept if and only if

On Removing the Random Oracle and Obtaining Full Security
The quoting construction above is provably selectively secure in the random oracle model. We now suggest a few potential avenues for adapting the above construction to full security in the standard model. First, with an eye to remove the random oracle, we observe that our signatures share many properties with the private keys of hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) schemes. To remove the random oracle, while remaining under a selective definition, one might use the Boneh-Boyen techniques [12] to instantiate H (m) = g m h, where h ∈ G is added to the public key, and there is a method for mapping the message space to Z p . Similarly, one might remove the random oracle by instantiating H with the Waters hash [60] and applying his proof techniques. This can be viewed as a full security construction with a reduction to the concrete security parameter by roughly a factor of (1/O(q)) lg , where q is the number of signing queries, and is the length of the quote. A direction for achieving full security could be the recent "Dual System" techniques introduced by Waters [61] . One obstacle in adapting the Waters system is that it contains "tags" in the private key structure, which would likely make our rerandomization step difficult for our context-hiding property. Lewko and Waters [42] recently removed the tags, which may make their techniques and construction more suitable for our application. One drawback in using their HIBE techniques to construct signatures is that even the signatures resulting from their construction require (slightly non-standard) decisional complexity assumptions. Thus, it is unknown how to balance time/space efficiently while achieving full security in the standard model from a simple computational assumption such as CDH.
Security Analysis
We now provide a proof of Theorem 4.2 by showing the following lemmas. Proof. Given any two challenge messages M = (t, m), M = (t , m ) such that P(M, M ) = 1, we claim that whether t = 1 or 0, SignDerive(pk, σ, M , M) has an identical distribution to that of Sign(sk, M), which implies that the two distributions are statistically close.
Let , denote |m| and |m | respectively. Let = min(
Sign(SK, M) is composed of the following values:
j , for i = 1 to and j = 0 to lg( − i + 1) 
, which is comprised of the following: M ) = (B, S, Z β−1 , . . . , Z 0 ) is the following, for random u, u i ∈ Z p :
Since all exponents have been independently rerandomized, one can see by inspection that SignDerive(P K, σ, M, M ) has identical distribution as that of Sign(sk, M ). Thus, the powers-of-2 construction is strongly context-hiding. Proof. We first apply Lemma 2.8, which allows us to only consider adversaries A that asks queries to Sign oracle in the simpler NHU game. Suppose an adversary A can produce a forgery with probability in the selective NHU unforgeability game; then we can construct an adversary B that breaks the CDH assumption with probability plus a negligible amount.
We are now ready to describe B which solves the CDH problem. On input the CDH challenge (g, g a , g b ) , B begins to run A and proceeds as follows: Selective Disclosure A first announces the message M * on which he will forge. Setup Let L be the maximum size of any message and let n = lg(L) . Let M * = (t * , m * ) and * = |m * | and let β be the highest bit of * set to 1 (numbering the least significant bit as zero). Set e(g, g) α := e(g a , g b ), which implicitly sets the secret key α = ab.
For i = 0 to n − 1, choose a random v i ∈ Z p and set
Finally, B gives the public key P K = (g, g z 0 , . . . , g z n−1 , e(g, g) α ) to A and will answer its queries to random oracles H and H s interactively as described below.
Random Oracle Queries Proceeding adaptively, A may make any of the following queries which B will answer as follows:
H (x):
The random oracle is answered as follows. If the query has been made before, return the same response as before. Otherwise, imagine dividing up m * into a sequence of segments whose lengths are decreasing powers of two; that is, the first segments would be of length 2 β where β is the largest power of two less than * , the second segment would contain the next largest power of two, etc. Let m * ( j) denote the segment of m * corresponding to power j. If no such segment exists, let m * ( j) =⊥. Select a random γ ∈ Z p and return the response as:
g γ if |x| = 2 j and j < β and m * ( j) = x (x is on the selective path); g bγ otherwise (x is not on the selective path).
Note that H (m * ( j) ) is set according to the first method for all segments of m * except the first segment m * (β) .
H s (x):
The random oracle is answered as follows. If the query has been made before, then return the same response as before. Select a random δ ∈ Z p and return the response as:
Note that H s (m * ( j) ) is set according to the first method only for the first segment of m * .
Signature and Quote Queries
Sign (M): Let M = (t, m) and = |m|. Recall that β * is the highest bit of * set to 1 and that we are counting up from zero as the least significant bit.
We describe how to create signatures.
1. When t = 1 and m * is not a substring of m (Type I Signature Generation):
Here m i, j denotes the substring m of length j starting at position i. It will help us to first establish the variables X i, j , which will be set to 1 if on the selective forgery path and 0 otherwise. We give a set of "rules" defining terms and make a few observations. Then we describe how the reduction algorithm creates the signatures. Observations Before we show how B will simulate the signatures, we make a set of useful observations. (a) If X i+2 j , j−1 = 0, then it follows by Observation 1g that H s (m i,2 j ) = g bδ for some known δ ∈ Z p , so choose random s i, j ∈ Z p , implicitly set r i, j := −a/δ + s i, j and set
Across Together with the following values for i = 3 to and j = 0 to min(
(a) If X i, j = 1 and X i+2 j , j−1 = 1, choose random r i, j ∈ Z p with implicitly set x i, j = x i, j + ab and x i+2 j , j−1 = x i+2 j , j−1 + ab and set
and r i, j := −a/γ + s i, j and set
(c) Else, if X i, j = 0 and X i+2 j , j−1 = 1, then H (m i,2 j ) = g bγ for some known γ ∈ Z p by Observation 1f. Choose random s i, j ∈ Z p with implicitly set x i, j = x i, j , x i+2 j , j−1 = x i+2 j , j−1 + ab and r i, j := a/γ + s i, j and set
(d) Else, X i, j = 0 and X i+2 j , j−1 = 0, so choose random r i, j ∈ Z p and set 
• If t * = 1, s i denotes the position where m * i starts. B can compute the information of some x i, j with the following components of σ * .
B has the values of g x s j , j g −x s j−1 , j−1 for j = β − 1 down to 0 and g α g −x 1+2 β ,β−1 , so can compute
c j because the signature is valid.
Thus, whether t * is 1 or 0, B can solve for g α = g ab and correctly answer to the CDH challenge.
Analysis The distribution of the above game and the security game are identical. Thus, whenever A is successful in a forgery against our scheme, B will solve the CDH challenge.
A Construction for Subset Predicates based on ABE
The Subset Predicate We now point out a surprising connection to Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE). We show that existing constructions for Ciphertext-Policy ABE [10, 41, 62] naturally lead to context hiding quotable signatures for arbitrary message subsets (as opposed to the substring predicate considered in the previous section). In particular, let U be a set of strings over an arbitrary alphabet. These strings can be used to encode elements for different types of sets. A message will be a set of strings from U . A general way to define the subset predicate would be P(M, m ) = 1 iff m ⊆ m i for some m i ∈ M. Recall from Sect. 2 that M is a set of messages, which might have been independently authenticated. Here, we want to disallow "collusions" between two different signatures where m is a subset of the union of multiple messages in M, but not any single one. (Otherwise, this would be trivially realizable from standard signatures schemes). In other words, our focus here is extracting a subset from a single signed set. Thus, we will restrict our attention in this section to the simple predicate P(m, m ) = 1 iff m ⊆ m.
The Construction at a High-Level Our main tool is an observation of Naor that shows that secret keys in Identity-Based Encryption [14] can function as signatures. Recall that in (ciphertext-policy) attribute-based encryption an authority provides secret keys to a user based on the user's list of attributes. The main challenge in building such systems is preventing collusion attacks: two (or more) users with distinct sets of attributes should be unable to create a secret key for a combination of their attributes. If we treat elements in a message m ⊆ U as attributes, that is, we treat a message m = {a 1 , . . . , a } ∈ U as a set of attributes a 1 , . . . , a , then we can define the signature on m as a set of secret keys corresponding to the attributes in the message. Verifying the signature can be done by trying to decrypt some test ciphertext using the secret keys in the signature. Now, given a signature on m we derive a signature on a subset of the elements in m by simply removing the secret keys corresponding to elements not in the subset. For context hiding, we need to re-randomize the resulting set of secret keys. (Not all CP-ABE schemes may support the removal and re-randomization of secret keys in this manner, but the schemes of [10, 41, 62] 
do).
Since ABE security prevents collusion attacks, it is straight forward to show that these signatures are unforgeable in the sense of Definition 2.3. Moreover, due to the rerandomization of secret keys, a derived signature is sampled from the same distribution as a fresh signature and is independent from the given signature. This implies strong context hiding in sense of Definition 2.4.
This unexpected connection between quoting and ABE leads to the following theorem, stated first informally. [10, 41, 62] In other words, when the ABE scheme provides adaptive (resp, selective) security, then the resulting signature scheme achieves adaptive (resp., selective) unforgeability. The (third) ABE scheme of Waters [62] provides selective security from the Decisional Bilinear Diffie Hellman assumption. Adaptive security is proven for the Bethencourt et al. construction [10] , but only in the generic group model. The construction of Lewko et al. [41] proves adaptive security under certain static assumptions using composite order groups.
The Subset Construction from Existing CP-ABE Schemes
We now formalize the intuition and claims of the previous section. [5] ) Let {P 1 , P 2 , . . ., P n } be a set of parties. A collection ⊆ 2 {P 1 ,P 2 ,...,P n } is monotone if ∀B, C : if B ∈ and B ⊆ C then C ∈ . An access structure (respectively, monotone access structure) is a collection (resp., monotone collection) of non-empty subsets of {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n }, i.e., ⊆ 2 {P 1 ,P 2 ,...,P n } \{∅}. The sets in are called the authorized sets, and the sets not in are called the unauthorized sets.
In the context of CP-ABE, the role of the parties is taken by the attributes. Thus, the access structure will contain the authorized sets of attributes. We restrict our attention to monotone access structures.
Definition 5.2. (CP-ABE Algorithm Specification)
A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption system for message space M and access structure space G is a tuple of the following algorithms:
Setup(λ, U ) → (PK, MK). The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ and a universe description U , which defines the set of allowed attributes in the system. It outputs the public parameters PK and the master secret key MK. Encrypt(PK, m, ) → CT. The encryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters PK, a message m and an access structure and outputs a ciphertext CT associated with the access structure. KeyGen(MK, S) → sk. The key generation algorithm takes as input the master secret key MK and a set of attributes S and outputs a private key sk associated with the attributes. Decrypt(sk, CT) → m. The decryption algorithm takes as input a secret key sk associated with attributes S and a ciphertext CT associated with access structure and outputs a message m if S satisfies or the error message ⊥ otherwise.
The correctness property requires that for all sufficiently large λ ∈ N, all universe descriptions U , all (PK, MK) ∈ Setup(λ, U ), all S ⊆ U , all sk ∈ KeyGen(MK, S), all m ∈ M, all ∈ G and all CT ∈ Encrypt(PK, m, ), if S satisfies , then Decrypt(sk, CT) outputs m.
Security Model for CP-ABE Let
= (Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, Decrypt) be a CP-ABE scheme for message space M and access structure space G, and consider the following experiment for an adversary Adv, parameter λ, and attribute universe U :
Start. Setup(λ, U ) is run to obtain the public parameters PK and master secret key MK. Phase 1. Adversary Adv is given PK and access to the oracle KeyGen(MK, ·), which generates a private key corresponding to an attribute set of the adversary's choosing. Challenge. The adversary outputs two messages m 0 , m 1 ∈ M and a challenge access structure * such that none of the sets of attributes queried during Phase 1 satisfy it. A random bit b is chosen and Encrypt(PK, m b , * ) is run to produce CT * , which is then given to the adversary. Phase 2. The adversary is given access to the oracle KeyGen(MK, ·), with the restriction that it cannot query the oracle on any set of attributes that satisfy * . Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b of b. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if and only if b = b. Security) A CP-ABE scheme is secure for attribute universe U if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries Adv, there exists a negligible function negl such that:
Definition 5.3. (CP-ABE
We say that a system is selectively secure if we add an Init stage before Start where the adversary outputs the challenge access structure * (instead of waiting until Challenge to do so).
CP-ABE with Key Reduction
Our construction requires that the holder of a private key can efficiently "remove" attributes from his private key and then re-randomize the remaining private key. We formalize this as follows.
Definition 5.4. (CP-ABE with key reduction)
We say that a CP-ABE system for attribute universe U supports key reduction if there exists an efficient algorithm KeyReduce(PK, sk, S, S ) → sk . The key reduction algorithm takes as input the public parameters PK with a private key sk associated with attribute set S and outputs a private key sk associated with attribute set S , if S ⊆ S, and ⊥ otherwise. It is not a coincidence that this definition strongly resembles the context-hiding definition presented earlier. Fortunately, we observed that several existing CP-ABE schemes support key reduction. In fact, we are not aware of any prior bilinear map-based schemes that do not support key reduction, although it is possible to construct contrived counterexamples 10 and it seems plausible that such schemes could naturally arise in the bilinear, lattice, or other settings. Proof. We argue this claim by providing a key reduction algorithm for each scheme. In all cases, the output is perfectly indistinguishable from the normal key generation algorithm. 10 One can build a contrived example that does not support key reduction. For instance, suppose we took an existing CP-ABE scheme and added a standard signature (from the authority) on the set S of attributes associated with the key. Then add to the decryption algorithm a check for the existence of a valid signature on the key and that the key matches this signature before proceeding with decryption.
• KeyGen(MK, S) → sk: The key generation algorithm chooses random t 1 , . . . , t n max ∈ Z p . The private key sk is:
• KeyReduce(PK, sk, S, S ) → sk : The key reduction algorithm chooses random t 1 , . . . , t n max ∈ Z p . The private key sk is:
The Subset Signature Construction
be a CP-ABE scheme that supports key reduction with the algorithm KeyReduce AB E . Let have an arbitrary, finite and efficiently-samplable 11 message space M and access structure space G that supports AND gates. Let U be a set of strings over an arbitrary alphabet. We construct a signature scheme that supports computing on authenticated subsets of U as follows.
KeyGen(1 λ ):
Run Setup AB E (1 λ , U ) to obtain the key pair (pk, sk), which will serve as the public and secret keys of the signature scheme. Sign(sk, m ⊆ U ): Run KeyGen AB E (sk, m) to obtain an ABE private key which will be treated as the signature σ . Efficiency The efficiency of the subset signature construction is closely linked to the efficiency of the ABE scheme employed. Recall that messages to be signed are sets of strings. The signing algorithm for a message m corresponds directly to the time for the CP-ABE scheme to produce a private key for the set of attributes in m. Thus, signing time is likely to scale with the size of the message. For the CP-ABE schemes discussed above, computing a signed subset requires a re-randomization of the remaining subset elements, and thus scales with the size of the subset. The verification time is dominated by an encryption under the AND of all attributes in m (the message being verified) together with a decryption of the resulting ciphertext using the subset signature as the private key. Overall, an efficient CP-ABE scheme will result in a practical subset performance. Proof. This follows directly from the key reduction property of the CP-ABE scheme. Let (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1 λ ) be a key pair. A signature scheme (KeyGen, SignDerive, Verify) is strongly context hiding for the simple subset predicate P if for all such triples ((pk, sk), m, m ) where P(m, m ) = 1, the following two distributions are statistically close:
Security Analysis
where the distributions are taken over the random coins of Sign and SignDerive. If we substitute the signature algorithms for their underlying CP-ABE algorithms, we have the following two distributions:
where the distributions are taken over the random coins of KeyGen AB E and KeyReduce AB E . The statistical closeness of these distributions is directly guaranteed by the key reduction specification when the predicate is satisfied, i.e., m ⊆ m.
Lemma 5.8. (Unforgeability)
If is a (resp., selectively) secure CP-ABE scheme that supports key reduction, then the above subset signature scheme is (resp., selectively) unforgeable in the Unforg game.
Proof. We first apply Lemma 2.8, which allows us to only consider adversaries A that asks queries to Sign oracle in the simpler NHU game.
We deal with the non-selective case first. Suppose an adversary A can produce a forgery with probability in the NHU selective unforgeability game; then we can construct an adversary B that breaks the selective security of the CP-ABE scheme with key reduction with probability 1/2 + /2. B begins to run A and proceeds as follows:
Setup When B receives the public parameters pk from its challenger, it passes these on as the signature public key to A.
Sign When A queries Sign(m), B queries its key generation oracle on m and returns the response to A.
Response If A does not output a valid forgery, then B simply chooses and outputs a random bit. If A outputs a valid message-signature pair (m * , σ * ), where m * is not a subset of any message queried to Sign, then B picks two arbitrary messages m 0 , m 1 in the message space of the CP-ABE scheme. It outputs these to its challenger together with a challenge access structure, which is the AND of all attributes in m * . (Recall that in this signature scheme messages are sets of strings). This challenge access structure is allowed, under the CP-ABE security experiment, because none of the other private keys created by the oracle can satisfy it. Once the challenge ciphertext CT * is returned, B simply uses the private key σ * to decrypt CT * and to then state which of the two challenge messages was encrypted.
The Selective Case Suppose an adversary A can produce a forgery with probability in the NHU selective unforgeability game; then we can construct an adversary B that breaks the selective security of the CP-ABE scheme with key reduction with probability plus a negligible amount. B behaves as above, except that prior to Setup there is a selective disclosure phase where A first announces the message m * on which he will forge. B then announces to its challenger that its challenge access structure will be the AND of all attributes in m * . This information is latter used, as before, in B's Response phase, where now A will only output σ * . Analysis The following analysis applies to both the selective and non-selective cases. The view of A when interacting with B is identical to its view when interacting with a real NHU game challenger. Whenever A correctly produces a forgery, then B correctly identified the challenge message. Whenever A fails to produce a forgery, then B guesses the challenge message with probability 1/2. Thus, if A succeeds with probability , then B succeeds with probability + (1 − )/2 = 1/2 + /2.
Computing Weighted Averages and Fourier Transforms
So far we only constructed schemes for univariate predicates P. We now give an example where one computes on multiple signed messages. Let p be a prime, n a positive integer, and T a set of tags. The message space M consists of pairs:
Now, define the predicate P as follows: P(ε, m) = 1 for all m ∈ M and 12 12 Recall, the signature on is the output the KeyGen algorithm. 1 , v 1 ) Signature schemes for this predicate P are presented in [2, [15] [16] [17] [18] while schemes over Z (rather than F p ) are presented in [32] . These schemes were originally designed to secure network coding where context hiding is not needed since there are no privacy requirements for the sender (in fact, the sender is explicitly transmitting all his data to the recipient). The question then is how to construct a system for predicate P above that is both unforgeable and context hiding. Fortunately, we do not need to look very far. The linearly homomorphic signature schemes in [17] can be shown to be context hiding. We state this in the following theorem. Unforgeability is Theorem 6 in [17] , which holds only when tags t i ∈ T are generated independently at random by the signer. While context hiding has not been considered before for this scheme, it is not difficult to show that the scheme is context hiding. The scheme is unique in the sense that every vector v has a unique valid signature. 13 It is easy to show that any homomorphic unique signature must be context hiding and hence NCS 1 is context hiding.
P (t
Viewed in this way, the scheme NCS 1 gives the ability to carry out authenticated addition on signed data. Consider a server that stores signed data samples s 1 , . . . , s n in F p . The signature on sample s i is actually a signature on the vector (s i |e i ) ∈ F n+1 p , where e i is the ith unit vector in F n p . The server stores (i, s i ) and a signature on (s i |e i ). (The vector e i need not be stored with the data and can be reconstructed from i when needed). Using SignDerive, the server can compute a signature σ on the sum ( n i=1 s i , 1, . . . , 1). Since the schemes are context hiding, the server can publish the sum n i=1 s i mod p and the signature σ on the sum and (provably) reveal no other information on the original data. The "augmentation" (1, . . . , 1) proves that the published message really is the claimed sum of the original samples (the tag t prevents mix-and-match attacks between different data sets). We can similarly publish a sum of any required subset.
More generally, the server can publish an authenticated inner product of the samples s := (s 1 , . . . , s n ) with any public vector c ∈ F n p without leaking additional information about the samples. This is needed, for example, to publish a weighted average of the 13 Recall that in unique signatures [43] in addition to the regular unforgeability requirement there is an additional uniqueness property: for any honestly generated public key pk and any message m in the message space, there do not exist values σ 1 , σ 2 such that σ 1 = σ 2 and yet Verify(pk, m, σ 1 ) = Verify(pk, m, σ 2 ) = 1.
original data set. Similarly, recall that the Fourier transform of the data (s 1 , . . . , s n ) is a specific linear operator (represented by a specific n × n matrix) applied to this vector. Therefore, we can publish signed Fourier coefficients of the data. If we only publish a subset of the Fourier coefficients, then by context hiding, we are guaranteed that no other information about (s 1 , . . . , s n ) is revealed.
Conclusion and Open Problems
In summary, the goal of this work is the study of computing on authenticated data. We presented one unified framework for a variety of distinct concepts in this area, including arithmetic, homomorphic, quotable, redactable, and transitive signatures. The definition we provide tackles unforgeability as well as a strong notion of privacy, where an adversary is unable to distinguish a derived signature from a fresh one even when given the original signature. In this setting, we provide generic constructions for all univariate and closed predicates, as well as specific efficient constructions for predicates such as quoting, subsets, weighted sums, averages, and Fourier transforms.
This work leaves open a host of interesting problems. First, one can imagine predicates that support more complex operations on signed messages. One natural set of examples are spreadsheet operations such as median, standard deviation, and rounding on signed data (satisfying unforgeability and context hiding). Other examples include graph algorithms such as computing a signature on a perfect matching in a signed bipartite graph. Still other examples involve efficiently expanding quoting/redacting to more complex data types, such as (potentially compressed) graphical images.
A first step in this direction may be to improve upon some of the constructions for basic predicates presented herein. For example, as discussed at the end of Sect. 4.2, for quoting/redacting on simple text, it is still unknown how to balance time and space efficiently while achieving full security in the standard model from a simple computational assumption.
